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Abstract 
In this paper, I defend the view that self-deception is a moral failure. Instead of saying that self-
deception is bad because it undermines our moral character or leads to morally deleterious 
consequences, as has been argued by Butler, Kant, Smith, and others, I argue the distinctive badness 
of self-deception lies in the tragic relationship that it bears to our own values. On the one hand, self-
deception is motivated by what we value. On the other hand, it prevents us from valuing those things 
properly. I argue that we owe it ourselves to take seriously our own values, by striving to properly 
value them. This gives us both prudential and moral reasons to avoid self-deception. 
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Introduction 
Florence Foster Jenkins was a New York City socialite renowned for two things: her love of music 
and her complete lack of musicality. This lack of musicality was apparent to everyone, with the 
unfortunate exception of Florence. Indeed, Florence fancied herself to be an accomplished operatic 
soprano, and was known to ‘treat’ audiences to her tuneless warbling in private recitals throughout 
the 1920’s, 30’s, and 40’s. Her ‘career’ culminated in a public concert at Carnegie Hall, where her 
performance caused uproarious laughter and pandemonium. Florence’s lack of self-awareness was not 
the result of simple musical ignorance. She was, in fact, an accomplished pianist who had no difficulty 
judging other peoples’ performances. Rather, the historical record paints Florence as a self-deceiver who 
maintained her self-deception by surrounding herself with a chorus of flatterers, and by dismissing the 
awful reviews of her recitals as mere professional jealousy (Bullock 2016). 
There is clearly something undesirable about Florence’s situation. At the very least, I know that 
I would strongly prefer not to be like Florence when it comes to any of my life projects. And we can 
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motivate this intuition from another direction, by considering the sorts of reactions we’d expect 
Florence to have if she were ever to discover her self-deception. When we uncover our own self-
deceptions, after all, we typically react to these discoveries with a mixture of embarrassment, shame, 
guilt and self-contempt. Being self-deceived seems an intrinsically bad and undesirable state of affairs. 
But exactly what is so bad about self-deception? This is the question that this paper seeks to answer. 
  Historical accounts of self-deception’s badness are a bit too heavy-handed for cases like 
Florence’s. Bishop Joseph Butler, for instance, condemned self-deception as “a corruption of the 
whole moral character in its principle” (1729), while Adam Smith decried it as “the source of half the 
disorders of human life” (1759), and Immanuel Kant warned of it being the means through which our 
propensity for evil takes root within our moral character (1793; 1797). These diagnoses appear apt 
when applied to some self-deceivers—for instance, high-ranking Nazis who insisted that they had no 
idea what was happening in the concentration camps—but they seem overly moralistic when leveled 
at an out of tune songstress whose self-deception remained contained within a fairly narrow epistemic 
domain, and never resulted in any great moral harms.   
 More recently, there has been a resurgence of philosophical interest in self-deception, but with 
the exception of some neo-Kantian approaches (Darwall 1988; Baron 1988; Bagnoli 2012), the 
attention has largely shifted away from moral issues and towards the psychological and epistemic 
puzzles surrounding the phenomenon (see e.g. Fingarette 1969; Pears 1984; Mele 2001; McLaughlin 
and Rorty eds. 1988).1 At the same time that these new debates have emerged, the classic moralistic 
viewpoint has come to seem old-fashioned, with some philosophers now arguing that self-deception 
is not as morally heinous as Kant and others envisaged it to be (Martin 1986; Kirsch 2005). Indeed, 
self-deception may well be personally beneficial (e.g. Rorty 1994; Kirsch 2005; Blumenthal-Barby and 
 
1 To illustrate this trend, note that the Stanford Encyclopedia article on self-deception includes only a short discussion of 
its moral dimensions (DeWeese-Boyd 2016). 
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Ubel 2018). While this optimism is not entirely misplaced, I still think it leaves out something 
important about Florence’s situation. Her self-deception may have caused nobody any significant 
harm, but it still strikes me that her life has gone badly wrong in an important way.  
 On my view, Butler, Smith and Kant correctly sensed that self-deception involves a moral 
failing of some kind. But corruption of one’s general moral character is not the fundamental issue with 
self-deception. What is bad about self-deception, I argue, is that it leads us to disrespect our own 
values. This is a moral failing because, as I will show, we are under an obligation to respect our own 
values, in much the same way that we are under an obligation to respect other peoples’ values.   
 To show why self-deception’s connection to valuing makes it a morally bad state that we have 
a self-regarding obligation to avoid, I first argue for the following claim in Section 1:   
MOTIVATION: Self-deception is motivated by what we value. 
That is, self-deception does not strike at random, but instead infiltrates the very epistemic domains 
that we, as valuers, ought to care about. My aim in arguing for MOTIVATION is not to provide a full 
account of self-deception’s etiology, but instead to show why understanding self-deception’s 
substance can help to explain why it is undesirable even in cases where it leads to no serious moral 
harms.  
With this partial origin story in place, I move on in Section 2 to argue for RATIONAL PRESSURE: 
RATIONAL PRESSURE: If we value something, we are under rational pressure not to be self-
deceived about it.  
Self-deception, as I will show, undermines our ability to properly value the values that motivate it. 
Insofar as valuing something entails a commitment to properly valuing it, self-deception will be 
something that we are under rational pressure to avoid.  
  In Section 3, I go beyond this claim about rational failures, and argue for a claim about self-
deception’s moral badness:  
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MORAL FAILURE: Self-deception is a distinctly moral failure, because we owe it to ourselves 
to avoid undermining our own values. 
To argue for MORAL FAILURE, I show that we, as valuers, have a prima facie self-regarding obligation 
to take seriously our values by (among other things) striving to properly value them. I wrap up this 
section by considering the limits of this moral obligation.  
This leaves me with the following position on self-deception’s moral badness. Self-deceivers 
ostensibly affirm a contradiction: their self-deception about some topic, X, affirms that they 1) think 
that X is worth valuing, and thus properly valuing and that 2) X is not worth valuing properly. But 
they haven’t affirmed just any contradiction—they’ve affirmed a contradiction within an epistemic 
domain that they, as valuers, have committed to getting right. In failing to honor this commitment, 
they fall short of what they owe to themselves as valuers.  
 
Section 1: Self-Deception and Valuing 
My aim in this section is to argue for MOTIVATION, which says that self-deception is motivated by 
what we value. As will become clearer in the next two sections, I think that understanding what 
motivates self-deception can shed light on why we have reason to avoid it.  
Before arguing for MOTIVATION, I’ll say something about the epistemological literature to 
which it is responsive. Note that my aim is not to substantively engage with this literature, or to offer 
a complete account of the nature or origins of self-deception. In defending MOTIVATION, I hope to 
offer an account that is broadly parsimonious with the leading positions within the epistemological 
literature on self-deception. There are two broad types of answers that have been given to the question 
of how we become self-deceived. First, intentionalist accounts model self-deception after interpersonal 
deception, such that there is some sort of division within the self that allows us to intentionally deceive 
ourselves (Rorty 1972; Pears 1984; Davidson 1982; Bermúdez 2000). Second, anti-intentionalist accounts 
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understand self-deception as a process of desire-driven false belief-formation (Mele 2001; Johnston 
1988; McLaughlin 1988; Barnes 1997; Nelkin 2002). The self-deceiver desires that some proposition, 
p, be true, and her desire leads her to “manipulate...a datum or data relevant, or at least seemingly 
relevant, to the truth value of p” such that she acquires the belief that p (Mele 2001, p. 51). 
MOTIVATION, as I understand it, is consistent with both the anti-intentionalist picture and 
the intentionalist picture.  If self-deception is intentional, we must presumably have some reason for 
deceiving ourselves. So in the intentionalist context, MOTIVATION is the claim that what we value 
supplies that reason. If self-deception is desire-driven, on the other hand, MOTIVATION is the claim 
that the type of desires that lead to self-deception are those desires that are tied up with our values. I 
will confess that my own sympathies lie with the anti-intentionalist, so I will be couching my argument 
in broadly anti-intentionalist language –– with values playing the role that anti-intentionalists typically 
attribute to desires. But the basic point I am making is consistent with both views.  
To explain why we gain something by identifying valuing rather than desiring as the motivator 
of self-deception, consider the following example. When I come home after a long day at work, I 
often find myself with a fairly strong desire to watch a saccharine reality television show like The Great 
British Bakeoff, and a much weaker desire to watch an acclaimed art film like The Last Year at Marienbad. 
My desire to watch Bakeoff has never led to any self-deception—if I don’t watch the show one night, 
I don’t find myself thinking that I’ll definitely watch it the next night. My Marienbad desire, in contrast, 
is almost certainly the subject of self-deception. I sometimes, for instance, find myself musing that if 
even if I pass on Marienbad tonight, I will certainly watch it soon. Somehow, I still believe this, despite 
the fact that I have been putting off watching Marienbad for over half a decade.   
Why am I self-deceived about my chances of watching Marienbad, but not Bakeoff? What 
distinguishes desires that motivate us towards self-deception from desires that don’t, I believe, is the 
extent to which we identify with them. I want to be the sort of person who can appreciate art films—
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and so I value having a desire to watch Marienbad. In contrast, while I also want to watch Bakeoff, I 
don’t particularly value or identify with that desire—I don’t take great pride in watching Bakeoff 
regularly, nor would I particularly care if I stopped desiring to watch it.  
Self-deception, I want to suggest, bears a robust connection to what we value, and to the 
valuing process more generally. We can start to understand this connection by taking a closer look at 
what it means to value. By ‘valuing’, I have in mind a concept that is more selective than desiring; we 
may value many of the things we desire, but we may also desire things that we do not value, or that 
we positively disvalue. Valuing, further, is not reducible to any single attitude, belief, or behavior. 
Instead, it has been understood by Samuel Scheffler and others as a “complex syndrome” of doxastic 
attitudes, affective attitudes, actions, and commitments (2011; see also Svavarsdöttir 2014; Anderson 
1993). On Scheffler’s account, for instance, valuing something consists in judging it to be valuable or 
worthy, having affective and cognitive attitudes towards it that one regards as apt, and seeing it as 
generating reasons for action (2011, p. 32).  
The “complex syndrome” that Scheffler describes can break apart in various ways. Most 
commonly, we find ourselves confronting gaps between the doxastic attitudes associated with valuing, 
and the action that those attitudes are meant to generate. Consider again the Marienbad example. When 
I say that I value art films, I don’t simply mean that I think that it is a good thing that they exist in the 
world. Instead, my statement implies that I aspire to be a valuer of art films — which involves engaging 
with and appreciating them. What I lack, as a valuer, is action—I don’t, as a matter of fact, actually 
watch many art films.  
Similarly, we sometimes find ourselves acting in ways that reflect values that we do not endorse. 
Imagine that you take pride in your rigorously proletarian tastes, but nevertheless find yourself inclined 
to watch as many Criterion Collection films as you can get your hands on. You might feel all sorts of 
affective attitudes in relation to these films—excitement upon finding a DVD of Marienbad at a garage 
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sale, disappointment when the art house cinema in your town closes, and so forth. Nevertheless, you 
are embarrassed about these attitudes, finding them objectionably pompous. You live as though you 
value art films, but you don’t identify as a valuer of them.  
Do either of us value art films? There is a sense in which we both do—after all, we both tick 
off some of the boxes that Scheffler and others have associated with valuing. I have doxastic and 
affective attitudes, while you have affective attitudes and actions. Further, it would be reasonable for 
people to call both of us valuers. That someone could aptly accuse me of not living in accordance with 
my values, for instance, speaks to the fact that I value art films. Likewise, you could reasonably be 
charged with valuing art films more than you’d like to admit. But the senses in which we count as 
valuers are both far from ideal. I would be a better valuer of art films if I actually watched and enjoyed 
art films, and you would be a better valuer of art films if you endorsed your secret hobby. 
For the purposes of my paper, I’m going to break valuing’s ‘complex syndrome’ into two 
broad ‘parts’. First, valuing can be identified with certain doxastic attitudes—believing X to be 
valuable, believing that it would be a good thing if one were a valuer of X, and believing that one 
ought to set ends with regard to the appreciation and promotion of X. Call this component of valuing 
‘endorsement’. Endorsement typically also involves some affective attitudes; an endorser of X may 
want to set ends with regard to X, and may feel emotionally invested (to some extent at least) in being 
a valuer of X. Note that endorsement is the central sense of valuing that I will be working with in this 
paper. As such, whenever I refer to ‘valuing’ tout court in this paper, I will be referring to valuing as 
endorsement.  
The second part of valuing, which I will call ‘embodiment’, involves treating values as reasons 
for actions, and setting ends in accordance with them. Embodiment, like endorsement, is typically 
accompanied by affective attitudes; I may enjoy pursuing the ends I set with regard to X, may feel 
frustrated when that pursuit goes awry, and so forth.   
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Often, we end up living in a way that embodies the values that we endorse. Call this alignment 
‘proper valuing’. Sometimes, however, endorsement and embodiment come apart. We can fall short 
of proper valuing in at least two ways. First, we can embody values that we absolutely don’t endorse, 
as illustrated in the case of the art film lover who nevertheless eschews all things pretentious. Second, 
we can incorporate our endorsed values into our lives in a way that does not appropriately reflect the 
value we take them to have. To illustrate: suppose that you, like Florence, really value being a good 
singer. This might motivate you to take vocal lessons, but it might also motivate you in another 
direction—you might find yourself so horrified by the prospect of being a bad singer, that you actively 
avoid situations in which you might be asked to sing. Active engagement and anxious avoidance both 
reveal our endorsed values. Nevertheless, they are not both ways of embodying our values. Indeed, 
anxious avoidance often ensures that we never embody our endorsed values. 
With this picture of valuing, we can now establish MOTIVATION, which says that self-
deception is motivated by our values—or more specifically, by the values we endorse. To start, note 
that self-deception reveals what we value. We can’t even begin to understand Florence’s self-deception, 
for instance, until we appreciate the value she places in being a good singer.  Likewise, our endorsed 
values are revealed in cases of self-deception that do not involve beliefs about the self. Consider the 
sort of people who are self-deceived about the realities of global warming. Their self-deception speaks 
to their endorsed values—most typically, it speaks to the value they place in their conservative political 
identity. They endorse pro-business, anti-regulatory values, and they are resistant to evidence and 
beliefs that they perceive as threatening those values. Finally, we can even extend this valuing story to 
cases of what Alfred Mele (1999) has called ‘twisted’ self-deception (i.e., cases in which we have self-
deceived beliefs about things being worse than they really are). The hypochondriac who self-deceptively 
thinks that every headache and freckle signals cancer is revealing something about what she values—
namely, that she values being healthy.  
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We can also motivate MOTIVATION by considering how it stacks up against a closely related, 
but importantly distinct, way of understanding the connection between self-deception and valuing. 
Someone suspicious of MOTIVATION might argue self-deceivers are valuing something else which may 
be superficially similar to the value that they purport to care about, but ultimately distinct from it.2  
They might say instead that Florence doesn’t really value being a good singer, but merely values being 
a famous singer. In the same spirit, we might tell a friend who is self-deceived about his unsatisfying 
relationship that he doesn’t really value his romantic partner (much as he may say he does), but instead 
merely values the security that comes from having a long-term relationship.  
 But this kind of rationalized re-interpretation of the self-deceiver’s behavior gets things wrong. 
To see why, remember what it means to embody a value. Embodied values are the values that we live 
by. Someone who merely embodies a value is thus living in a way that reflects a value she does not 
endorse. We see this discrepancy in the example of the person who is accused of being self-deceived 
about the fact that he is staying in his fraught relationship because he values security, and not because 
he values the person with whom he shares his relationship. When we accuse him of valuing security 
instead of his partner, we’re not saying something about the values he endorses—we’re saying 
something about the values he embodies.  
 So far, the objection gets something right about this case: the security-lover does value security. 
Nevertheless, the sense in which he values security is one of embodiment, rather than endorsement. 
That he is self-deceived about this embodiment, however, is evidence that he has a value that is both 
motivating his self-deception, and being undermined by it. Indeed, that the security-lover can’t 
consciously reckon with the fact that he would rather stay in an unsatisfying relationship than subject 
himself to the vagaries of casual dating speaks to how much he disvalues being the sort of person who 
has that preference. He wants to be someone who only stays in a relationship if he loves the person 
 
2 I owe this objection to Philip Yaure.   
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with whom he shares it. This is the value he endorses, if not embodies. And so, he is self-deceived 
about staying with his partner—he thinks he’s staying with her out of love, when really, he’s staying 
with her out of habit. His self-deception thus keeps him in a situation in which his endorsed value will 
remain unsatisfied. So long as his fear of the unknown keeps him in his unhappy relationship, he will 
never find himself in a relationship that he’d want to stay in for reasons other than security.  
 To put this point another way, we must realize that self-deception has a protective function to 
play within our psychological lives, insofar as it shields us from painful realities. But these realities are 
only painful if we value their opposites.  It was no great tragedy for me to realize that I can’t sing, 
because I don’t particularly care about singing. It is only a tragedy for Florence because she values 
being a good singer. If she ever abandoned this endorsed value, her self-deception would be 
unnecessary, and might (with sufficient evidence) disappear.  
So self-deception reveals our values. But why think that these values are what motivate us 
towards self-deception, as MOTIVATION implies?  To start answering this question, let’s consider why 
self-deception tends to cluster around ‘valuing domains’. We’re self-deceived about our relationships 
and political affiliations, but not about our socks or whether we’d prefer peanut butter or Nutella.3 I 
think that the fact that self-deception tends to concentrate within epistemic domains that implicate 
our values (e.g. our relationships, our children, our moral characters) can be partially explained by the 
type of thing that valuing is. To see why the process of valuing creates an especially fertile ground in 
which self-deception can grow, think back to the attitudes and dispositions that Scheffler associated 
with valuing. When we value something, X, we have an antecedent commitment to X’s valuableness, 
an emotional vulnerability towards X that we see as apt, and a disposition to treat X-related 
considerations as reasons for action. These attitudes and dispositions, taken together, can give rise to 
 
3 To the extent that we can imagine being self-deceived about a Nutella preference, it will be because that preference bears 
some connection to our values. If I value a healthy diet, for instance, I might be self-deceived about how strongly I prefer 
Nutella to natural peanut butter.  
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self-deception. Antecedent beliefs about X’s value can lead us to discount the testimony of people 
whom we perceive as not valuing X. Emotional vulnerabilities towards X can bias our evidence-
gathering by making certain true beliefs around X too painful to countenance, and certain false beliefs 
too comforting to resist. And ongoing engagement with X can give us opportunities to selectively 
gather evidence about it, thus solidifying our self-deceived beliefs.  
Finally, the very fact that valuing involves numerous attitudes, beliefs, and reasons for action 
can shed light on why it predisposes us to self-deception.  Self-deception, I think, often gets its 
foothold in the gap between endorsement and embodiment. We might think that something is 
incredibly valuable, but nevertheless struggle to embody it in our lives. Or we might have emotional 
reactions in connection to the objects of our values that we find inappropriate or overblown. These 
sorts of mismatches are uncomfortable. Self-deception, then, can be understood as a way of bringing 
a feeling of stability to a valuing process that, due to its multifaceted nature, is prone to being unstable.  
The preceding discussion should not be understood as providing a complete etiology of self-
deception; such an account is well beyond the scope of this current project, and may not even be 
possible (Mele 2019). In particular, my account does not solve the ‘Selectivity Problem’ of self-
deception. This problem is usually framed in terms of desires: if desires motivate us toward self-
deception, why is it the case that not all desires (or even all unfulfilled desires) lead us to be self-
deceived? (see e.g. Bermúdez 2000). There is an analogous question about why valuing something 
does not lead to self-deception in every case. What independent factor separates self-deceiving valuers 
from valuers who are not self-deceived? While this is a fascinating question, it is not one that I will 
attempt to resolve in this paper. Instead, I will now turn to the question of why self-deception’s 




Section 2—Self-Deception and Improper Valuing 
In this section, I will argue that when we value something, we are under rational pressure to avoid 
being self-deceived about it. I will argue for this claim as follows: 
Premise 1 (from MOTIVATION): When we are self-deceived, we are always self-deceived about 
something we value.   
Premise 2: If we value something, we’re under rational pressure to properly value it. 
Premise 3: If we’re self-deceived about something, we’re improper valuers of it.  
Conclusion (RATIONAL PRESSURE): Therefore, if we value something, we are under rational 
pressure not to be self-deceived about it. 
Section 1 defended Premise 1. In Section 2.1 I will argue for Premise 2. I then move on to argue for 
Premise 3 by establishing that self-deception both causally contributes to devaluing (Section 2.2) and 
that it is constitutively incompatible with proper valuing (Section 2.3).  
 
2.1—Valuing and Proper Valuing 
To motivate Premise 2, recall first that proper valuing, on my account, involves an embodiment of 
one’s endorsed values.  But what embodiment involves is difficult to spell out in the abstract. This is 
partially because values themselves put constraints on what can count as proper valuing by making 
different ends, beliefs, and attitudes appropriate or inappropriate. For instance, properly valuing 
someone as a romantic interest isn’t consistent with being their stalker. In addition, the particular ends 
that we set in regard to the objects of our values shape what is involved in properly valuing. Valuing 
music might lead you to learn an instrument, or to become a patron of your local orchestra—what it 
takes to properly value music will look different depending on which of these projects you pursue. 
We can set these nuances aside; all that I need for this argument is the idea that there are some ways 
of responding to our values that fall short of embodiment.  
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 Regardless of what proper valuing involves in any particular case, I want to suggest that the 
fact that we value something puts us under rational pressure to properly value it. To see why, try to 
disentangle valuing from proper valuing. Suppose I told you that I cared deeply about the 
environment, and then continued to explain that I drove a gas-guzzling Hummer, proudly supported 
the illegal depletion of the rainforest, and would never donate to a conservation charity. What sense 
could you make out of my statements? You might think that I was somehow mistaken—perhaps, for 
instance, I’m mistaken in thinking that I value the environment. Or maybe you’d think I was just lying. 
Regardless, there would be something odd about what I have told you: specifically, my second 
statement seems to directly cut against my first. 
 My claim that valuing rationally requires a commitment to proper valuing should not be taken 
to imply that any deficiency in this commitment is tantamount to not valuing. One can be committed 
to proper valuing even if one sometimes falls short. Likewise, this commitment need not be 
categorically overriding. Still, even in cases in which we fall short of this commitment, we generally 
experience it as having normative force. An environmentalist might regret having to take a plane to 
visit a dying relative, for instance, even if they think that their decision was all-things-considered 
justified.    
 Valuing thus rationally requires a commitment to proper valuing in much the same way that 
setting an end rationally requires us to will the means to that end, or else abandon it. In the next two 
subsections, I will motivate Premise 3 by locating two ways in which self-deception leads us to 
disrespect, and thus fail to embody, the values motivating it: self-deception can causally contribute to 
us acting in ways that are anathema to proper valuing (2.2), and it can lead us to disrespect these values 





Let’s first consider the causal link between self-deception and devaluing. As noted in Section 1, we set 
ends in relation to what we value. Self-deception typically makes us bad at figuring out what ends to 
set, and how to pursue our values. If you’re self-deceived about how well you’re doing academically, 
for instance, you won’t see yourself as having a reason to study more.  
 Sometimes, self-deception might be a rather minor impediment to pursuing appropriate ends. 
At other times, it can lead us to ‘pervert’ the values that motivate it, such that we actually come to 
embody their opposites. To see what I mean by ‘perversion’ here, think back to Florence. Because she 
is self-deceived, Florence overestimates her ability to handle difficult repertoire. As a result, she turns 
serious arias into unintentional comedy numbers. Someone listening to Florence’s rendition of the 
Queen of the Night aria for the first time would not think that she was simply a bad singer. Rather, they 
would likely assume that she was intentionally parodying the operatic form.4  
This perversion is also present in more prosaic cases of self-deception. Suppose that you are 
so attached to your relationship that you can’t seriously entertain the possibility that it may be in 
trouble. If you end up self-deceptively underplaying the seriousness of your relationship issues, your 
self-deception will be best explained by appeal to the value you place in that relationship: you wouldn’t 
self-deceptively believe that your relationship was fine if you didn’t care about continuing it. But just 
as your self-deception is motivated by the value you place in your relationship, so too does it 
undermine that value.  If you can’t see the cracks in your relationship, you won’t be able to mend 
them.   
Someone might object that self-deception can actually at times promote our ends, and the values 
they reflect (Szabados 1974, Kirsch 2005). It can, for instance, sometimes gives us the “fake it ‘til we 
make it” confidence that we need to accomplish our ends. A fledgling comedian might need to be a 
 
4 A recording of the aria is available here: https://youtu.be/V6ubiUIxbWE  
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little self-deceived about her chances of bombing onstage in order to have the confidence to actually 
do well at open mic night. Her self-deception is not undercutting her values, but is instead actively 
promoting the ends that she has set with regard to them.  
There are two things to say about this case. First, if one thinks that self-deceived beliefs are 
necessarily false, or at least epistemically unwarranted, then this case may not be a case of self-
deception, provided the performance is in fact successful. The comedian arguably has a true and 
epistemically warranted belief—namely that her set will not bomb—where part of the evidence for 
the belief is the presence of the belief: the fact that she is confident because she thinks she won’t 
bomb makes her less likely to bomb (McLaughlin 1988, p. 46).  The comedian may not have relied on 
this particular piece of evidence to form her belief—but the evidence that she does access presumably 
can’t have ruled out the truth of her belief. If it had, then no amount of confidence would have been 
sufficient for her to have a good set. That many low-level ‘self-deceptions’ don’t actually involve false 
beliefs might be sufficient to make us think that they’re some other species of motivated reasoning.  
That said, there are certainly some fledgling comedians who have a completely unwarranted 
belief in their chances of succeeding at their first open mic night, such that no amount of confidence 
could possibly up their chances of not bombing. Here’s what my account can say about them. Self-
deceived comedians value being good comedians. Their willingness to perform at open mic nights, 
along with their self-deception towards their performances are both evidence of this fact. Because 
they value being good comedians, they’re invested in properly valuing. As such, we can trust that they 
don’t want to be delivering unfunny performances. And yet that’s exactly what their self-deception 
leads them to do: to give a terrible, unfunny performance that is at odds with their endorsed value. In 
this sense, their self-deception helps make them into what they want to be least of all, namely, an 
unfunny comedian.  
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To be sure, giving some terrible performances may often be a necessary means to having a 
great set. But this doesn’t erase the fact that those awkward initial performances, fueled by self-
deception, were crimes against comedy. Even once a comedian becomes successful, they will likely 
still be embarrassed about those awful early shows. And they will further be embarrassed by the fact 
that they were self-deceived about how bad they really were at the beginning, insofar as their self-
deception cut against their commitment to producing good comedy. In other words, even if they grant 
that it was all things considered a good thing that they were self-deceived at the beginning of their 
career, they might still reasonably wish that they could have found some way to be both self-aware 
and willing to go on stage. Thus, self-deception frustrates proper valuing even when it is fairly trivial, 
and when it is ultimately pragmatically beneficial.  
Occasionally, there may be cases where sheer luck prevents self-deception from having an 
impact on the objects of our values, or where self-deception’s causal devaluing is ostensibly ‘cancelled 
out’ by sheer luck or a countervailing prudential commitment. I might, for instance, be self-deceived 
about my chances of passing an exam, only to have the exam cancelled at the last minute. Or, the 
effects of my self-deceived belief that I am good at math might be tempered by my standing policy of 
always double-checking my sums (no matter how confident I am about them). But these cases are not 
counterexamples to the view; they are simply cases where the undermining effects of self-deception 
have been blocked by extrinsic factors. My self-deception in these cases is still value-undermining, 






5 Likewise, we can say that drunk driving is safety-undermining even in cases when it doesn’t cause an accident.  
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2.3—Constitutive Devaluing 
In addition to causally devaluing the values that motivate it, self-deception is constitutively at odds with 
proper valuing, such that the very state of being self-deceived makes impossible some components of 
proper valuing.  
 First, self-deception frustrates our ability to know the objects of our values, and the 
relationship that we presently bear to them. This violates what I take to be a constitutive requirement 
of proper valuing—if we value something, we should know, and should want to know, what it is that 
we’re valuing and how we’re doing at valuing it. Valuing someone as a friend or romantic partner, for 
instance, involves having some sort of ongoing interest in knowing more about them, as well as a 
commitment to knowing where we stand in relation to them (MacKenzie 2018). Our curiosity need 
not be unbounded (even our nearest and dearest sometimes bore us to tears), but its complete absence 
is generally a sign that our valuing has run its course. And so too does valuing projects, ideals, and 
objects of inquiry involve a commitment to knowing. If a purported valuer of philosophy were to tell 
you ‘I value philosophy—but I don’t know, or care to know, what it is’, you’d think that she was 
pulling your leg. 
 That proper valuing involves a commitment to knowing does not imply that we need to know, 
or even want to know, everything about the objects of our values in order to be proper valuers. Further, 
valuing something often involves being antecedently predisposed to think well of it in a way that can 
be in tension with having maximally accurate beliefs. If I value you as a friend, I may be more likely 
to give you the benefit of the doubt when you do something hurtful. Instead, when I say that valuing 
involves a commitment to knowing, I mean that there are limits to the amount of ignorance and 
insensitivity we can have towards objects of value, and the ends that we set in regard to them. It’s one 
thing to find certain facets of your life project uninteresting—and it’s quite another to find the entirety 
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of that project dull. Likewise, it’s one thing to see your child through rose-colored glasses, and it’s 
another to not have the faintest sense of who they really are.  
Self-deception is at odds with the commitment to knowing that is part of proper valuing.  
Thus, insofar as it keeps us from seeing clearly the objects of our values, and our relation to them, it 
is constitutively incompatible with proper valuing.  
Self-deception is constitutively incompatible with proper valuing in at least one other way. 
Valuing, as previously noted, involves emotional vulnerability. It can be a great source of joy, but it 
can also be a great source of sorrow. Properly valuing something typically requires that we view both 
sorts of emotions as potentially apt reactions to our values. To make this aspect of valuing more vivid, 
think about the intense sorts of emotional reactions that one may experience in the process of trying 
to launch a music career. A fledgling musician might feel joy at having landed a gig, but she’ll also feel 
sorrow if nobody comes to hear her play, and embarrassment if she performs poorly. These sorts of 
negative emotional reactions aren’t regrettable byproducts of valuing. Rather, they’re part of what is 
involved in being emotionally vulnerable to one’s values. 
Self-deception, in contrast, gives us a ‘get out of jail free’ card in relation to valuing’s most 
painful emotions. Florence’s self-deception protects her from feeling the disappointment and 
embarrassment that her cacophonic recitals would otherwise engender. But in avoiding this range of 
negative emotions, she cuts herself off from an important aspect of valuing. She loses out on the full 
valuing experience that those of us who aren’t self-deceived get to partake in.  
 
Section 3—Moralized Self-Deception 
Let’s recap. Self-deception is incompatible with proper valuing. And insofar as valuing rationally 
requires a commitment to proper valuing, it will be something that we are under rational pressure to 
try to avoid. Nevertheless, RATIONAL PRESSURE need not have much moral ‘oomph’ by itself. We 
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are, for instance, under rational pressure to not hold contradictory beliefs. But it doesn’t follow from 
this that we have a moral obligation to spend lots of time trying to discern whether beliefs from 
disparate epistemic domains are fully compatible with each other. Further, when we discover such 
incompatibilities, we rarely have the sorts of moralized reactions to them that discoveries of self-
deception typically engender. I don’t feel that I’ve let myself (or anyone else) down when I realize that 
I both believe that Vatican City is a city in Italy, and that Vatican City is the smallest country in the 
world.   
In this section, I aim to argue for MORAL FAILURE, which says that self-deception is a 
distinctly moral failure because we owe it to ourselves to avoid undermining the objects of our values 
(Section 3.1).  I’ll also consider the limits of this obligation (Section 3.2).  
Note that I will be presupposing the existence of self-regarding obligations. Readers who are 
skeptical about self-regarding obligations are invited to translate my claims about them into claims 
about the moral reasons that we have to treat ourselves in certain ways.  
 
3.1—Why We Have Moral Reason to Avoid Self-Deception 
The reason that self-deception often strikes us as a moral shortcoming is that it undermines something 
that we have moral reason to take seriously: the objects of our values. In cases where these objects are 
morally relevant, we have a straightforward moral reason to take them seriously. Consider Carla 
Bagnoli’s example of a mother who is self-deceived about her daughter’s anorexia (2012, 99-100). The 
mother’s self-deception leads her to violate the duties of care that she has towards her daughter. Her 
self-deception speaks to the fact that she values her daughter’s wellbeing, and recognizes herself to 
have duties to promote it, but it also stands in the way of her helping her daughter.  
 Since we have moral reason to embody many of our endorsed values, self-deception is often 
something that we have a straightforward moral reason to try to avoid. But while this can explain the 
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moralized reactions that we would likely have to the mother who is self-deceived about her daughter’s 
anorexia, it does little to explain the moralized reactions that we are likely to have in cases like 
Florence’s. The value that Florence is disrespecting, after all, is not a moral value: if bad singing were 
a moral wrong, then karaoke bars would be dens of iniquity. And yet, I think it would be reasonable 
to think that Florence ought to know better and that she shouldn’t go so easy on herself. Lest there is 
any doubt that these oughts and shoulds are moralized, consider the reactions we’d expect Florence 
to have towards her own self-deception if she ever uncovered it: we’d think it would be reasonable 
for her to experience some measure of shame, guilt and self-reproach.  
How can self-deception instill non-moral values with moral content? The answer lies in the 
connection that valuers bear to their endorsed values. We are, fundamentally, valuers—we are not 
simply automata propelled around by whichever first-order desires happens to be strongest, but are 
instead agents who make judgments about what and how to value (Bratman 2000). What we value is 
a product of those judgments. A failure to take seriously our endorsed values is thus a failure to take 
seriously those judgments, and by extension, the person who made them. 
To clarify this last point, consider the reasons that we typically have to take seriously other 
peoples’ value judgments. First, we may have a reason to take their value judgments seriously because 
they are good judges. When my foodie friend recommends a restaurant, or my effective altruist friend 
recommends a charity, I take those recommendations seriously. Second, we may have a reason to take 
peoples’ value judgments seriously simply because they’re theirs—the very fact that you’ve decided to 
structure a significant portion of your life around some project (be it tap dancing, political activism, 
parenthood, and so forth) gives me a reason to take that project seriously. I don’t have to approve of 
it or actively engage with it—but I shouldn’t dismiss it out of hand, ridicule it, or condemn it (unless 
I have a good countervailing reason to do so).   
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I think the same reasons to take values seriously are present in the first-personal case as well. 
First, we typically have an expertise about ourselves that others lack (even if self-deception prevents 
perfect transparency). We thus have an authority-related reason to take seriously the judgments we’ve 
made about what it would be good for us to value. This reason is defeasible, but it provides a 
presumptive case in favor of taking seriously the values we endorse. Second, our status as autonomous, 
rational agents gives us a reason to take seriously our endorsed values. To constantly second guess our 
judgments about what values to endorse, or to not attempt to embody those values, is tantamount to 
not respecting ourselves as agents capable of making decisions about how to live.  
We can see the requirement to take seriously the objects of our values by embodying them 
when we consider the extent to which people ‘moralize’ their life projects. An artist might feel that 
she owes it to her art to complete it, while philosophers (in my experience) sometimes talk about 
‘doing right’ by their arguments. And someone who has embraced an ‘alternative’ personal aesthetic 
may think that she’s sacrificed something morally important when she takes out her piercings to 
placate her boss. I do not claim that we actually have moral obligations to our paintings, philosophical 
projects, or piercings. But we do have moral obligations to ourselves as valuers—one of which, I 
believe, is to take the objects of our values seriously by striving to properly value them. 
This explains why we have a moral reason to avoid self-deception even in ‘non-moral’ cases 
like Florence’s. Self-deceivers ostensibly affirm a contradiction. Through their actions and attitudes, 
self-deceivers simultaneously affirm: (1) that X is worth valuing, and thus properly valuing and (2) that 
X isn’t worth properly valuing. But they haven’t affirmed any old contradiction—they’ve affirmed a 
contradiction within the very epistemic domain that they, as valuers, have antecedently committed to 




3.2 The Limits of Our Obligation to Avoid Self-Deception 
I have argued that that self-deception is a distinctly moral failure because we owe it to ourselves to 
avoid undermining our own values. This does not mean that our obligation to avoid undermining our 
own values is unconditional: the moral reasons we have to properly value the objects of our values 
and thus to seek to avoid self-deception can certainly be outweighed by weightier countervailing moral 
considerations. In this section, I’ll discuss two such considerations.  
 
3.2.1—Immoral Values 
First, consider cases in which the value driving our self-deception is immoral. Imagine that a self-
deceived pickup artist believes himself to be a Lothario, despite actually being wildly unsuccessful with 
women. This case fits the picture of self-deception that I have provided: the value that this man places 
in being a pickup artist has led him to become self-deceived about his skill at seducing women. But it 
leaves us with two questions: is the self-deceived pickup artist disrespecting the ‘value’ of being a 
pickup artist by being self-deceived about the extent to which he has successfully embodied it? And is 
he thereby disrespecting himself by failing to properly value his values? The answer to these questions 
depends on whether one thinks that we can ever be obligated to properly value something that, morally 
speaking, ought not to be valued.   
 Let’s suppose that we can be under such pressure—the very fact that one values being a pickup 
artist, in other words, would put one under rational (and on my account, moral) pressure to properly 
value this objectionable goal. So long as the self-deceived pickup artist retains a commitment to valuing 
pickup artistry, his self-deception will constitute a failure to properly value something that he has 
committed to properly valuing.  
Of course, whatever moral badness results from this failure, it will be outweighed by 
competing moral considerations. Even if there’s something bad about his self-deception, it may still 
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be consequentially good that his self-deception frustrates his efforts to achieve his objectionable goals. 
And we could also think that, while he may be obligated to take seriously his present values by properly 
valuing them, he’s also obligated to make sure that his values are worth valuing.  
 Now let’s suppose that we can’t be under rational pressure to properly value something that, 
morally speaking, ought not to be valued. We could put this position in terms of properly valuing: 
perhaps there simply is no such thing as ‘properly valuing’ the ‘value’ of being a pickup artist because 
pickup artistry fundamentally rests on mistaken beliefs about how other people should be treated. If 
so, then our pickup artist is under rational pressure to abandon the value motivating his self-deception: 
since valuing rationally requires a commitment to proper valuing, and since that commitment is 
unfulfillable in this case, he ought to abandon the ‘value’. Since his self-deception prevents him from 
responding to this pressure, he is falling short of what he owes to himself as a valuer. Under both 
interpretations, our self-deceived pickup artist is falling short—and it makes sense that he would react 
to a discovery of his self-deception with feelings of shame, guilt and self-reproach.  
 Both analyses of the case bring out another, more fundamental way in which self-deception 
frustrates us as valuers. Respecting ourselves as valuers requires that we take the objects of our values, 
whatever they are, seriously by properly valuing them. But it also requires that we take seriously the 
process of choosing what values to endorse by subjecting our value judgments to scrutiny. Since these 
values reflect on us as valuers, we should want them to reflect well on us. 
Of course, we can’t constantly scrutinize our endorsed values. And nor should we: if we did, 
we’d never get around to actually trying to embody them. This is why failures of proper valuing are 
important: they provide us with specific opportunities to reflect on what, and on how, we value. The 
person who drops out of college, or who can no longer stand to be around their partner is given a 
chance to ask: is this really worth valuing? And if so, is it worth valuing like this? Whether they decide 
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to double down and properly value, or move on to greener pastures, they are still afforded an 
opportunity to take themselves seriously as valuers.  
Self-deceivers, in contrast, cut themselves off from the specific opportunities to reflect on 
these questions that valuing failures provide. Because he never realizes how bad he is with women, 
the wannabe-Lothario may not question the value of pickup artistry. And because she never realizes 
how bad a singer she really is, Florence may never question whether there is some other way to value 
singing, other than performing at Carnegie Hall. Self-deception thus frustrates our ability to embody 
the values we endorse, as well as our ability to question whether our endorsed values are worth 
embodying. So long as we owe it to ourselves as valuers not to fall short of proper valuing, our self-
deception will constitute a failure to fulfill a self-regarding obligation.  
 
3.2.2—Self-Deception Beyond Reproach 
Consider now a case of self-deception that seems morally beyond reproach. It’s one thing to say that 
Florence has wronged herself by being self-deceived, but it is quite another to argue that a late-stage 
cancer patient who self-deceptively believes that her prognosis isn’t terminal has fallen short of what 
she owes herself. This judgment is reflected in the sorts of third-personal reactions we often have to 
such self-deceptions: such self-deception engenders empathy, not contempt, and might be something 
that we have reason to promote (or at least not frustrate) amongst terminally ill patients. (Blumenthal-
Barby and Ubel 2018). Thus, there seems to be an important class of self-deceptions that we are not 
obligated to avoid.  
 I agree that the threat that the truth poses to our wellbeing is sometimes significant enough to 
warrant self-deception, and thus to justify an exception to the duty I have described. But this 
conclusion is unsurprising: the obligation we have to take seriously the objects of our values can at 
times be outweighed by competing moral considerations. 
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Even so, there is still something that the self-deceived patient loses out on. We might recognize 
that it is all-things-considered in his interests to be self-deceived, while still thinking that there would 
be something better about him facing his death with clear-eyed self-awareness. What the self-deceived 
patient loses out on, I think, is his last opportunity to properly value his own life. This value can be 
seen to be motivated by his self-deception—if he didn’t care so much about living, he wouldn’t be 
self-deceived about his own death. But it is also undermined by his self-deception; by being self-
deceived, he will likely lose out on some of his last opportunities to engage fully with the projects and 
people who gave his life meaning. He will also lose out on something more fundamental—the ability 
to engage fully with his life as it really is. His self-deception, while on balance morally defensible, still 
comes at a cost. And it’s a morally relevant cost, given what he values. 
 We can give a similar analysis for cases in which there appears to be something positively 
virtuous about being self-deceived. Consider Szabados’s discussion of a mother who self-deceptively 
clings to the belief that her son is still alive, despite mounting evidence to the contrary (1974, p. 28-
29). There is something morally admirable in this response, insofar as it speaks to how much the 
mother loves her son. This result is unsurprising on my account as self-deception speaks directly to 
what we value, and some of what we value is typically morally laudatory. But even in cases where there 
is something admirable about self-deception, it is still a failure of valuing. The self-deceived mother, 
for instance, cuts herself off from the sorts of painful, but apt, emotional responses that proper valuing 
would lead her to experience: she cannot grieve her son because she cannot see that she has reason to 
grieve. And in this way, she falls short of proper valuing. It is a failure that we should not condemn, 






We can now explain why self-deception is morally bad even when it doesn’t lead to any great moral 
harms. Its badness is locatable in the connection that it bears to the objects of our values: rather than 
striking at random, self-deception infects the very epistemic domains that we have antecedently 
committed to getting right. This means that we need not look outside the self to locate the moral 
badness of self-deception; instead, we need only to notice that self-deception involves a failure to 
properly relate to one’s values, and thus to oneself as a valuer.  
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